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aqueduct until the matters were resolved. The parties then sought a
judicial determination of their rights in order to avoid future conflict
and litigation.
The court considered: (1) whether the contractual provisions
allowing the City to unilaterally discontinue water delivery were
unenforceable and invalid as contrary to public policy; (2) the City's
obligations concerning the chlorination of the water in the Croton
Aqueduct for United Water's and Briarcliff's use; and (3) whether
United Water or Briarcliff was unjustly enriched by discarded water.
The court held that the contract provision allowing the City to
unilaterally discontinue delivery of potable water to United Water and
Briarcliff was unenforceable and invalid on public policy grounds.
The courts will not enforce contracts that injuriously affect the public
interest.
The court recognized that the City could not deny
applications from municipal corporations and water districts to tap
into its system, but could establish reasonable rules and regulations
governing the means by which the water was taken and the quantity.
The court reasoned that because United Water and Briarcliff had
limited alternative water sources and water storage capacity, a shortage
during the peak demand period could pose severe health and safety
risks for the communities served.
The court next considered whether the City was obligated to
chlorinate water in the Croton Aqueduct. The court held that the City
was not required to chemically treat the water as a condition of the
State's delegation of eminent domain power. The court stated that the
issue was one of cost, not public policy, and that unlike the obligations
to permit access to and delivery of water, the City's obligations to
chlorinate was established by the parties in the terms of their contracts.
The court determined that according to United Water's permit,
the City was contractually bound to partially chlorinate the water
available from the aqueduct. Because of the provision, United Water
was not unjustly enriched, and not liable to the City for the cost of
water discarded in order to fulfill the City's contractual obligations.
Briarcliff, however, had no contractual provision requiring the City to
chlorinate the water made available to them. Briarcliff asserted that
the City could have provided a reduced volume of potable water
without waste. The court remanded to determine whether Briarcliff
was liable to the City for discarded water, and if so, how much it owed.
Sommer Poole

Vinciguerra v. State of New York, 693 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1999) (holding
that head wall and culvert constructed partially on landowners'
property by State was not a de facto appropriation, and resulted in
acquisition of a prescriptive drainage easement).
Claimants purchased eight parcels of vacant, undeveloped land
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between January 1973 and November 1990. A concrete head wall and
culvert, part of a drainage system for a nearby state highway that had
been constructed by the State of New York ("State") in 1948,
encroached approximately two to two and one-half feet on claimants'
land, and directed water across claimants' property.
Claimants did not discover the head wall or culvert until 1989,
when they began grading and filling the property for construction of a
strip mall. A separate, visible stream flowed across the land and
accumulated in an area near the head wall and culvert, thereby
covering them when the steam flowed, purportedly the reason that
claimants never noticed the head wall and culvert. The claimants
never surveyed the property prior to their purchase in 1948, however,
they were aware of the ditch that carried the stream of water.
Claimants admit that the stream ran intermittently over the property,
and was dry at the time of the purchase of the property.
Claimants requested that the State redirect the waters flowing onto
the property as a result of the head wall and culvert. The State
declined, claiming that since the drainage system had been
uninterrupted in use since 1908, a prescriptive drainage easement
burdened the claimants' property. Claimants commenced an action
seeking damages for trespass, de facto appropriation, and prima facie
tort. The Court of Claims dismissed the prima facie tort claim on
summary judgment, and found that the State's action constituted a de
facto appropriation, not a trespass, for which the statute of limitations
had expired. The Court of Claims dismissed the claimants' action, and
claimants appealed.
The court addressed two issues: first, whether the State's action was
a constitutional taking which constituted a de facto appropriation, and
second, whether the State had gained a prescriptive easement, thereby
barring a claim for continuous trespass. The court held that the
State's actions did not reach the level of a constitutional taking and
therefore, was not a de facto appropriation of the claimants' property
requiring compensation. The court further ruled that the State
established a prescriptive easement for drainage over the claimants'
property.
The court first discussed the applicable scope for reviewing Court
of Claims holdings. The court stated that the scope was not limited to
determining whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence,
but that the court could factually assess whether the Court of Claims
granted a judgment warranted by the evidence, giving due deference
to trial court's decision.
In addressing the first substantive issue, the court stated that to
constitute a de facto appropriation, the government's intrusion on the
citizen's property and interference with the owner's property rights
must reach a degree that amounts to a constitutional taking requiring
compensation. The distinction between such a taking and trespass
"lies in the egregiousness of the trespass and whether it is of such
intensity as to amount to a taking." The court further noted that if the
interference with property rights was only temporary, casual, or
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intermittent, without permanent use or appropriation or destruction
of an existing right, only a mere trespass has occurred.
The court, based on these principles, found that the head wall and
culvert, and resulting intermittent surface water runoff from the state
highway, at most, hampered and complicated the claimant's
development plans, but were not so egregious as to amount to a
constitutional taking. Therefore, the State's action did not constitute a
de facto appropriation.
The court distinguished the impacts on the claimants' property
from other cases where the court had held a taking had occurred.
These cases involved the redirection of surface water to deprive a
litigant's access to thirty-five acres and destroy its value as a trout
stream; the appropriation of land for use in conjunction with an
adjacent landfill by installation of fencing, a trash compactor, and toll
gate, and erection of signs indicating that the property was a town
landfill; and placement of a drainage ditch occupying approximately
2.46 acres of claimants' land.
The court then assessed whether the State's action amounted to a
continuous trespass that could be barred by creation of a prescriptive
easement. The court stated the rule that a prescriptive easement is
established through clear and convincing evidence that use of the
subject property was adverse, open and notorious, and continuous and
uninterrupted for the prescribed period. The court found that the
State met this standard.
First, the court held that discharge of the surface water from the
highway, and placement of the head wall and culvert were adverse to
the claimants, as well as continuous and uninterrupted for the
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period in New York is ten years,
and the State had completed the head wall and culvert in 1948.
Second, the court ruled that the State's infringement on the
claimants' property was both open and notorious. The court found
that undisputed testimony revealed that at certain times during
claimants' ownership of the property, the stream near the head wall
and culvert was dry, making the head wall and culvert visible upon
inspection. Additional testimony revealed that when water ran onto
the property, the ditch in front of the claimants' property was
inundated with water, and a catch basin became openly visible. The
court reasoned that these facts, coupled with claimants' admission that
they never inspected the ditch and failed to survey the property prior
to purchase, supported the open and notorious nature of the State's
infringement. The court concluded that the State therefore had a
prescriptive drainage easement barring claimants' continuous trespass
claim.
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